Hamas Grad Info

http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ipc_e007.pdf

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC)

Summary of rocket fire and mortar shelling in 2008

3. Following are three major characteristics of the use made by Hamas and the other terrorist

organizations of rockets during 2008 (see chapter on statistical data for details):a. A dramatic increase in the extent of rocket fire and mortar shelling despite

the six months long lull in the fighting: in 2008, the peak year of rocket fire and

mortar shelling, a total of 3,278 rockets and mortar shells landed in Israeli territory

(1,750 rockets and 1,528 mortar shells). That is a significant increase compared to

2007 (the number of landings in 2008 more than doubled) and compared to the

previous years of the Palestinian terrorist campaign.

b. A significant increase in the number of Israeli residents exposed to rocket

fire within 40 km of the Gaza Strip: before 2008, the city of Sderot (about 20,000

residents) as well as villages around the Gaza Strip were the preferred target of rocket

fire and mortar shelling. In 2008, other cities and hundreds of thousands of Israelis

gradually entered the circle of fire: first the cities of Ashkelon and Netivot, and later,

during Operation Cast Lead, Ashdod, Beersheba, and other cities within a range of

40 kilometers from the Gaza Strip. The rocket attacks created a new reality in which

nearly one million Israeli residents (about 15 percent of the entire

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population) are exposed to rocket fire and mortar shelling in various levels of

intensity.

c. A significant improvement in the effectiveness of rockets and mortar shells

possessed by Hamas and an increase in their quantity: in 2008, Hamas put into

use 122-mm Grad launchers (for ranges of 20.4 km and approximately 40

km) and standard 120-mm mortars, which were smuggled into the Gaza Strip (in

our assessment, from Iran). Those standard rockets and mortars, significantly different

from self-manufactured rockets and mortars, not only increased the range of fire but

also increased its effectiveness. That is a result of increasing the rockets’

warhead size and their fragmentation. As for the mortars—the standard 120-mm

mortars are more precise and their range is greater than that of the other mortars

possessed by Hamas and the other terrorist organizations.

4. The quantity of rockets held by Hamas and the other terrorist organizations has also

increased, currently reaching, in our assessment, a constant supply of several hundred selfmanufactured

90 and 115-mm rockets and an unknown quantity of self-manufactured

long-range rockets capable of attaining greater ranges (up to 19 km). Also, we assess

that Hamas has dozens of standard long-range Grad rockets (122-mm) with a range of

20.4 km and a range of approximately 40 km, smuggled into the Gaza Strip through the

tunnels in the Rafah region, some during the lull in the fighting.

5. As a result of the rocket and mortar shell fire, eight people were killed in 2008, four of

them during Operation Cast Lead.1 During that operation, 58 people were injured as a result

of rocket and mortar fire, 10 of them moderately and severely (as at December 31, 2008).

Also, several dozen civilians were injured as a result of the rocket fire in 2008 (prior to

Operation Cast Lead), and several hundreds suffered stress-related traumas. The number of

fatalities, injuries, and stress-related traumas in 2008 is added to the number of casualties in

the previous years of the confrontation (2001-2007): 10 civilians were killed, 434 were

wounded, and thousands of civilians suffered from anxiety, shock, and various traumas as

a result of the fire. The continuing fire of rockets and mortar shells has a severe, cumulative

psychological effect on the population, causing severe damage to its social structure and

severe damage to its feeling of safety. The fire also disrupts the efforts to promote a peace

agreement between Israel and the Palestinians (the Annapolis process) by creating a lasting

1 In 2008, 21 people were killed as a result of terrorist attacks originating in the Gaza Strip, out of 31 killed as a

result of terrorist attacks during that year (Summary of 2008 by the Israel Security Agency).

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reality of rocket fire and counter-measures by Israel, which reached their peak in Operation

Cast Lead.

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6. What follows is a summary of statistical data in various spreads about the rocket fire and

mortar shelling in 2008 compared to previous years:

a. Rocket fire chart in yearly distribution, 2000-2008

b. Mortar shelling chart in 2000-2008

c. Rocket fire chart in monthly distribution in 2008

d. Mortar shelling in monthly distribution in 2008

e. Rocket fire and mortar shelling during the lull in the fighting

f. Rocket fire and mortar shelling during Operation Cast Lead (as at December 31)

g. New Grad rockets and mortars which became operational in 2008:

1.122-mm Grad rockets for a range of 20.4 km

2.122-mm Grad rockets for ranges of approximately 40 km

3.120-mm mortars

h. The number of Israeli residents in the main cities of south Israel (the Negev)

7. To complete the data and analysis in this document, one can draw upon four fundamental

papers written by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center in 2008:

a. Rocket threat from the Gaza Strip, 2000-2007 (December 2007)

b. Hamas’s military buildup in the Gaza Strip (Updated April 2008)

c. Anti-Israeli Terrorism in 2007 and its Trends in 2008 (May 2008)

d. The Six Months of the Lull Arrangement (December 2008)

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A total of 223 rockets and 139 mortar

A total of 223 rockets and 139 mortar

shells were fired during the lull in the

fighting, including 203 rockets and 121

mortar shells between November 4 and

December 19. In total, 362 rockets and

mortar shells were fired at Israel

during the lull in the fighting.