June 15, 2008, Vol. 1, No. 8, Combating Terrorism Center,
The Demise of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Southern Philippines, by Zachary Abuza,
Spring 2009, PS 598: The Politics of Terrorism and Violence,
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),
_________________________________________________________________________
June 2008, Vol. 1, No. 8, Combating Terrorism Center,
The Demise of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Southern Philippines,
June 15, 2008
Author: Zachary Abuza
Since launching a major offensive against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in August 2006, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have dealt the group a number of crippling blows. While members of the ASG are still at large, the frequency and lethality of their attacks have dropped precipitously since the first quarter of 2007, when several top commanders were killed. The ASG lack any semblance of central leadership at this point. Indeed, their continued existence seems to be more due to the AFP’s failings than to any concerted effort to regroup. Moreover, the ASG appears short on financial resources and has reverted back to spates of kidnappings for ransom, effectively jettisoning what little ideological pretensions the group ever had.
Background
Formed in 1991 by a veteran of the Afghan jihad, Abdurrajak Janjalani, the ASG developed as a small-scale terrorist organization committed to establishing an Islamic state in the Sulu archipelago [1]. Yet, unlike the larger Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the ASG was decidedly sectarian in its killings. The group attacked churches and kidnapped or killed Christian priests or missionaries. By 1996-1998, the group had been seriously degraded with the loss of their al-Qa`ida funding and the death of their leader, Abdurrajak. From 1996-2002, the Abu Sayyaf were no more than a group of well-armed kidnappers, driven by profit rather than ideological fervor. Although they gained international notoriety in 2000-2001 with several high-profile raids and large-scale kidnappings on Philippine and Malaysian dive resorts, they remained a criminal threat. The 2001 hostage taking of an American missionary couple and the beheading of another American citizen were the casus belli for the U.S. intervention in the southern Philippines. Since then, U.S. Special Forces have rotated in and out of the southern Philippines where they provide training and intelligence for their AFP counterparts.
The capture and killing of several ASG leaders in 2002 actually had a backlash: Janjalani’s younger brother, Khadaffy, consolidated a degree of power and re-oriented the group back toward its ideological principles. At the same time, the members of the Indonesian-dominated terrorist organization, Jemaah Islamiyah, based in MILF camps, established ties with the ASG. By 2003, all kidnappings had ceased, and starting in 2004 the ASG and JI had begun a new wave of terrorist bombings from Mindanao to Manila, prompting several offensives by government forces. An AFP bombing of a MILF safe house in the Liguasan Marsh where several ASG and JI members were holed up prompted the MILF to oust them [2]. By January 2005, top JI members Dulmatin and Umar Patek were based with the ASG in Jolo.
Operation Ultimatum began in August 2006 and continues to this day, although the real operational tempo diminished by mid-2007. U.S. military advisors and analysts were surprised that the AFP was able to maintain the offensive on Jolo Island for as long as they did. In all, eight battalions of AFP and Philippine Marines were deployed. Five years of U.S. training and assistance began to bear fruit and for the first time joint inter-service operations were showing real gains. In September 2006 and March 2007, two top leaders, Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, were killed [3]. Since then, the ASG has fallen into a tail spin.
Current State of the ASG
While a handful of press reports [4] and analysts [5] asserted that the ASG had appointed the Middle East-trained Yasser Igasan as their new leader, there was no evidence to support this claim. Igasan had been in Saudi Arabia since 2001 studying religion and fundraising for Moro causes. An April 2008 press report from the Philippines later denied that Igasan had become the group’s new chieftain, and Philippine security officials acknowledged that the ASG “haven’t been able to come up with a single, influential leader who can unite the different factions” [6]. Some of the remaining ASG leaders still at large include:
- Isnilon Totoni Hapilon, alias Salahuddin or Abu Mus`ab
- Radullan Sahiron, alias Kumander Putol
- Umbra Abu Jumdail, alias Dr. Abu Pula
- Albader Parad
- Osman, alias Usman or Rizal
- Gumbahali Jumdail
- Ustadz Hatta Haipe
- Tahil Sali
- Abu Sofian
- Suhod Tanadjalan, alias Kumander Suhod
The AFP asserted that Isnilon Hapilon was wounded in late April in a battle that killed his son [7]. Hapilon, who has a bounty from the U.S. government of up to $5 million, remains one of the leading figures of the movement. Although Radullan Sahiron remains at large, at 71-years-old and missing a limb the AFP no longer see him as an active leader. Umbra Abu Jumdail (Abu Pula) remains the second-most wanted figure, although Albadar Parad is often described as the group’s most violent and dangerous commander. What is clear is that there are distinct factions, and the ASG in no sense is a cohesive organization.
Fleeing the authorities and short of funds, the ASG is a diminished terrorist threat. In September 2007, an ASG operative was arrested en route to Manila where he was ordered to stage diversionary attacks. The most spectacular attack in the past year was the November 13, 2007 bombing-cum-assassination of Basilan Congressman Wahab Akbar, a former member of the ASG who had become an outspoken opponent against them [8]. In February 2008, two suspected ASG operatives were arrested in Davao Oriental with an Indonesian JI member, Baihaqi. On March 1, a homemade bomb ripped through a bar near an army base on Jolo, wounding six people. In mid-April, two bombs fashioned from 60-millimeter and 81-millimeter mortar shells were detonated outside of a Catholic cathedral and cafe in Zamboanga, although no one was injured [9]. That same month, police arrested an ASG operative in Quezon City, Alpaker Said (Abu Jandal), and charged him with the attack on Wahab Akbar. Police believed he was planning a new series of attacks [10]. There were many other small bombings in central Mindanao in late 2007 and early 2008, but most have been attributed to hard line elements of the MILF or the al-Khobar extortion gang, not the ASG [11]. Nonetheless, the ASG is still able to perpetrate lethal attacks, such as the May 29 bombing of an Air Force facility in Zamboanga that killed three and wounded 18 [12]. What is all the more remarkable is that due to being constantly on the run, the ASG has been unable to leverage the technical bomb-making expertise of two JI operatives implicated in the 2002 Bali bombing—Dulmatin and Umar Patek—who have been with the ASG since early 2005.
The AFP has engaged the ASG in a small number of fierce encounters. Two police were killed in Jolo in January 2008. At the end of that month, a pitched battle in Tawi-Tawi led to the death of Wahab Opao, as well as reports that JI operative Dulmatin was killed [13]. Although a body was later exhumed and DNA tested, U.S. officials have failed to conclude whether the body was in fact Dulmatin’s. Between February and April, nearly 10 soldiers and marines were killed in clashes on Jolo. What is more troubling is that clashes with the ASG on Basilan, which had been clear of the ASG for several years, are now drawing the AFP into battles with the MILF, who maintain a camp in Tipo-Tipo. In July 2007, 14 AFP were killed, 10 of whom were beheaded, when the ASG sought refuge in the MILF camp [14]. While the MILF admitted to killing the AFP in self-defense, they denied that they were fighting alongside the ASG, giving them sanctuary or that they had beheaded the troops [15]. On May 25, fighting again broke out between government forces and MILF and ASG combatants in Basilan, leaving six AFP dead. Again, the MILF denied any ASG presence [16].
Re-Degeneration: Return to Kidnappings
Perhaps the most telling sign of the ASG’s current state is their degeneration to kidnappings. While there were a number of incidences in 2007, the tempo has increased in the first half of 2008 and money has become the primary motive. In mid-January, a Roman Catholic priest was killed in a botched kidnapping, while a teacher from the parochial school was taken hostage. The teacher was released in late March after his family paid a 200,000 peso ($4,880) ransom. In March, a South Korean and Filipino were abducted. In early April, ASG members kidnapped a Department of Education official and several teachers. On April 10, ASG gunmen released seven persons they abducted separately. On May 28, a Filipino businessman in Zamboanga was abducted [17]. In all of these cases, the captives were released after ransoms were paid, suggesting that the ASG is short of funds.
What concerns Philippine officials most about the trend is that the ASG seem to be planning a new wave of high profile kidnappings of tourists. On March 13, a suspected Indonesian member of JI and ASG member were arrested on the resort island of Boracay, where authorities assert they were “casing” hotels and bars [18]. Most recently, on June 8 Ces Drilon, a popular senior reporter for ABS-CBN, was kidnapped by suspected ASG militants; a ransom is being demanded for her release [19].
How Does the ASG Survive?
Into the eighth year of U.S. training and hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid, not to mention the bulk of USAID funding being concentrated in Sulu and Mindanao, why have the ASG not been finished off? The current order of battle only puts them at 300-400 people. Although the terrain is very rugged, the AFP has considerable intelligence being provided from the United States. People in Jolo, at first resistant to the American presence, have been more receptive due to the civic action and medical missions being conducted. More intelligence is coming from tips from the local community who are increasingly tired of the ASG’s nihilism. Moreover, the United States has provided more than $10 million since 2001 for information leading to arrests of ASG members [20].
Part of the problem is that the operational tempo of the AFP is down considerably from 2007, when 127 ASG were killed and 38 captured [21]. The AFP has a tendency to not hold on to territory it has captured. In mid-April 2008, the Philippine Army disregarded the ASG as a threat and withdrew a large number of their forces from Jolo, leaving the bulk of operations with the marines.
A more cynical answer is that the AFP has little intention of finishing the job since that would end the pipeline of U.S. training and military assistance, which would force the funds allocated by the government in Manila to actually make it down to front-line troops. The campaign against institutionalized corruption in the AFP has not been as impressive. As the recent State Department report on terrorism noted, “Limited financial resources, inadequate salaries, corruption, low morale, limited cooperation between police and prosecutors, and other problems in law enforcement have hampered bringing terrorists to justice” [22].
Yet, the ASG is also the beneficiary of a government that has never tried to establish a holistic solution for its Moro troubles, instead killing operatives as they appear and implementing a divide and conquer policy toward the three disparate rebel groups. In March 2007, MNLF commanders in Jolo and Zamboanga quit the peace process and attacked government forces. Habier Malik joined up with the ASG in Jolo, in effect doubling their size, because the government had failed to implement the 1996 Tripoli Accords or attend the Tripartite Talks with the Organization of the Islamic Conference [23]. The government at first refused to attend the talks, citing the ongoing peace process with the MILF, and since then has attended but been non-committal. The parallel set of peace talks with the MILF has stalled since the November 2007 breakthrough on the issue of ancestral domain. In the end, the AFP and hardliners in the government have refused to endorse what government negotiators agreed on. Malaysia has since begun withdrawing their peacekeepers from Mindanao, and cease-fire violations are increasing [24]. Frustration on the part of all the various Moro ethnic groups is palpable, and few have any faith that the government ever negotiates in sincerity.
While all three groups have failed to develop a common program or platform, at the tactical level of autonomous field commanders, there is considerable cooperation. Although this has helped keep the ASG alive, they are clearly a diminished threat.
Dr. Zachary Abuza, Professor of Political Science at Simmons College, specializes in Southeast Asian politics and security issues. He is a graduate of Trinity College and received his MALD and Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the author of a number of books, including Muslims, Politics and Violence in Indonesia(Routledge, 2006), Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand and its Implications for Southeast Asian Security (U.S. Institute of Peace, 2008) and Militant Islam in Southeast Asia (Lynne Rienner, 2003). His monograph, Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf Group, was published by the U.S. Army War College’s Security Studies Institute in 2005. A study of Jemaah Islamiyah’s overt strategy of engaging in social welfare and charitable works, Jemaah Islamiyah and the Inverse Triangle, is due to be published in 2008.
Notes
[1] For more, see Zachary Abuza, "Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf," Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, September 1, 2005.
[2] Istiada Bte Oemar Sovie Interview," Philippine National Police, November 9, 2006.
[3] Zachary Abuza, "On the Defensive: Rebels Lose Ground in the Southern Philippines," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1, 2007.
[4] Jim Gomez, "Militant May Lead Philippine Terrorists," Associated Press, March 3, 2007.
[5] See, for example, Taharudin Piang Ampatuan, "Abu Sayaf’s New Leader: Yasser Igasan The Religious Scholar," RSIS Commentaries, July 9, 2007.
[6] "Abu Sayyaf Hit by Leadership, Funding Woes," Associated Press, April 4, 2008.
[7] Joel Guinto, "Abu Sayyaf Leader Hapilon, Son Wounded—Military," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 1, 2008.
[8] Three others were killed and 12 wounded at the attack on the congress. See "Rep. Wahab Akbar, 2 Others Killed in Batasan Bomb Blast," GMANews.tv, November 14, 2007; Samira A. Gutoc, "From Sandals to Suits: Wahab Akbar, the Rebel Turned Politician," MindaNews.com, November 15, 2007.
[9] "Suspected al-Qaida Militants Bomb Cathedral, Bank in Zamboanga," Sun Star, April 13, 2008.
[10] Joel Guinto, "Informant vs Abu Sayyaf Suspect Gets P500,000 Reward," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 28, 2008.
[11] For more on al-Khobar, see Zachary Abuza, "Criminal Gangs in the Southern Philippines," Jane's Intelligence Digest, April 10, 2008.
[12] "Bomb Kills Three Outside Philippine Air Base: Military," Agence France-Presse, May 29, 2008.
[13] "Dulmatin Died in May '07, Says Indon Prof," ABS-CBN News, February 21, 2008.
[14] "
Militants Kill 14 Philippine Marines; Behead 10," Agence France-Presse, July 11, 2007.
[15] Joel Guinto, "AFP Files Protest vs MILF over Basilan Attack," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 26, 2008.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Al Jacinto, "Businessman Abducted in Zamboanga – Reports," GMANews.tv, May 27, 2008.
[18] "Bali Bombing Suspect Held in Boracay resort," Gulf News, March 27, 2008.
[19] "TV News Reporter, Crew Missing in Philippines," CNN, June 11, 2008.
[20] Angelo L. Gutierrez, "US Spent Over $10M for Filipino Tipsters vs Islamic Militants," ABS-CBN, May 5, 2008.
[21] This data was provided in the State Department's 2007 Philippine Country Report.
[22] Ibid.
[23] "AFP Bares P1-M Bounty for Malik, Junks Ceasefire Call," ABS-CBN, April 18, 2008.
[24] Sean Yoong, "Malaysia Blames RP for Stalled Peace Talks," Associated Press, May 3, 2008.
_______________________________________________________________________
Spring 2009, PS 598: The Politics of Terrorism and Violence,
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Also known as al-Harakat al-Islamiyya, Abu Sayyaf translates as "Sword of God"
History: The original leadership of ASG fought in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion and brought radical Islamic teachings with them to the Philippines
[1]. ASG split off from the Moro National Liberation Front in the early 1990s. Yet, unlike the larger Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the ASG was decidedly sectarian in its killings. The group has historically targeted churches and kidnapped or killed Christian priests or missionaries. During 1996-1998, the ASG was seriously impaired by the loss of their al-Qaeda funding
[2]and the death of their leader,
Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani. Janjalani provided the majority of ideological guidance and networking with al-Qaeda during the formative years of ASG's development.
From 1996-2002, the Abu Sayyaf were no more than a group of well-armed kidnappers, driven by profit rather than ideological fervor. Although they gained international notoriety in 2000-2001 with several high-profile raids and large-scale kidnappings on Philippine and Malaysian dive resorts, they remained a criminal threat. The 2001 hostage taking of an American missionary couple and the beheading of another American citizen were the casus belli for the U.S. intervention in the southern Philippines. Since then, U.S. Special Forces have rotated in and out of the southern Philippines where they provide training and intelligence for their Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) counterparts.
The major military endeavor in the region, Operation Ultimatum began in August 2006 and continues to this day, although the real operational tempo diminished by mid-2007
[3]. U.S. military advisers and analysts were surprised that the AFP was able to maintain the offensive on Jolo Island for as long as they did. In all, eight battalions of AFP and Philippine Marines were deployed. Five years of U.S. training and assistance began to bear fruit and for the first time joint inter-service operations were showing significant territorial gains. In September 2006 and March 2007, two top leaders, Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, were killed
[4]. Since then, the ASG has suffer from organizational decay
[5] , lack of strong leadership, a lack of financial support and a lack of popular support
[6]. The current leader of ASG is Albader Parad, who alone had made P20 million from his group’s kidnapping operations in year 2000.
[7].
The members of Abu Sayyaf are self proclaimed mujahedeen and freedom fighters but are not provided social or political support by many people in Moroland including Muslim clerics.
Abu Sayyaf is estimated to have a core membership of 200 with an extended membership of over 2000
[8]. The ASG's low numbers indicate a lack of support among the local population. An early February 2009 estimate by Philippine Brig. Gen. Gaudencio Pangilinan concludes that hardcore ASG membership has been reduced to around 100 individuals
[9]. However, that estimate has been questioned by outsiders. There is speculation that the Philippine military has grossly underestimated the strength of ASG
[10].
They continue to have ties with their parent organization, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Jemaah Islamiya (JI), which is based mainly in Indonesia.
Geography: ASG is based in the southern Philippines. The ASG was originated in Basilan Province and primarily operates in the Sulu Archipelago, namely in the Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi provinces. The group has intermittent operations on the Zamboanga peninsula, and members occasionally travel to Manila
[11] .
Goals: ASG seeks the establishment of an Islamic state in the Philippines, specifically in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The long term goal is the creation of a pan Islamic State spanning Southeast Asia
[12].
In early 2009 ASG began to insist that they would end their random-seeking behavior, instead taking hostage with purpose of raising awareness of the condition of Muslim citizens in the Philippines
[13]. Instead of monetary demands for hostages, the ASG is demanding political negotiations and welfare concession from the Philippine government and local governmental authorities
[14].
These Short-term Goals Include:
• The pullout of the military from the Sulu province.
• The declaration of Jolo as an open port between Malaysia and Sulu to boast the economic development of the people of Western Mindanao.
[15]
Terrorism methods: Most recently, ASG has utilized kidnapping, extortion and banditry to achieve group goals. Historically, they have utilized bombing, beheadings and assassinations as terrorism tactics. In 2001 ASG kidnapped 20 people, including 3 Americans. ASG beheaded one of the American and held the other two for a year, demanding ransom. In 2002 during a rescue attempt by U.S.-trained Philippine commandos tried to rescue two hostages were shot. Two months late, ASG kidnapped six Filipino Jehovah’s Witnesses and beheaded two of them.
[16]
According to Philippine government officials, Abu Sayyaf uses the hostage-taking and ransoming to recruit new members, raising its organizational strength, and to acquire new equipment, including communications equipment and transportation, including trucks and speedboats.
Current activities:
September 2008
• September 21, 2008: Two Abu Sayyaf Group members who claimed to have met with wanted Jemaah Islamiyah members Dulmatin and Umar Patek surrendered to authorities. – Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 23 [17]
October 2008
• October 10, 2008: Authorities on Jolo Island in the southern Philippines killed an Abu Sayyaf Group member and captured three of his comrades. – AFP, October 11 [18]
• October 11, 2008: Authorities arrested a member of the Abu Sayyaf Group who was believed to be involved in the June kidnapping of journalist Ces Drilon. The operative, identified as Marcial Totoh Jabarot (also known as Abu Cesar), was arrested on Jolo Island in the southern Philippines. – Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 12 [19]
• October 18, 2008: Suspected Abu Sayyaf Group gunmen attempted to kill a Catholic priest in Basilan in the southern Philippines, although the priest's bodyguards were able to repel the attackers. The assailants were able to inflict a number of injuries. – AFP, October 18[20]
• October 21, 2008: A Philippine court extended a freeze on the assets of Hilarion Santos, the alleged leader of the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM). Santos was arrested three years ago and is on trial for kidnapping and rebellion. The freeze, which makes it illegal to sell off any properties owned by Santos, will be in effect until January 25, 2009. The RSM spun off from the Abu Sayyaf Group, and is primarily composed of Filipino Christians who converted to Islam. – AFP, October 21 [21]
• October 30, 2008: One of two aid workers held hostage by the Abu Sayyaf Group for 45 days in the jungles of the Philippines was released unharmed. The gunmen did not release the second hostage. According to a press report, the released hostage said she “lived in constant fear during her ordeal, with the rebels at one time threatening to cut off her fingers if her family refused to pay a ransom of two million pesos.” It was not clear whether a ransom was paid. – The Age, October 30 [22]
November 2008
• November 5, 2008: Authorities apprehended a sub-leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group—identified as Sakirin Andalin Sali—in Sulu Province in the southern Philippines. – GMANews.tv, November 5 [23]
• November 14, 2008: Philippine Marines killed an Abu Sayyaf Group militant—who was linked to a 2001 kidnapping of three Americans—on Jolo Island in the southern Philippines. The operative was identified as Faidar Hadjadi. – AP, November 16 [24]
• November 18, 2008: Philippine Marines apprehended Almid Jundam, a suspected Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) militant, in Sulu Province. Authorities claim that Jundam is a follower of ASG mid-level leader Gafur Jumdail, an explosives expert. – The Nation, November 21 [25]
• November 21, 2008: Authorities arrested two suspected members of the Abu Sayyaf Group. The men were allegedly planning to attack malls, bus stations and other civilian targets in the metropolitan area of Manila, the country’s capital city. – GMANews.tv, November 24 [26]
December 2008
• December 7, 2008: Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) fighters and Philippine Marines clashed on the outskirts of Basilan in the southern Philippines. During the encounter, five Marines and at least 50 ASG fighters were killed. One authority figure said of the incident, “This is part of our punitive operations against the Abu Sayyaf kidnappers in Basilan.” – Sun Star, December 9 [27]
• December 17, 2008: A Philippine court convicted four Abu Sayyaf Group members for the killing of two people during a 2001 attack on a resort in Davao del Norte Province. – AP, December 17 [28]
• December 19, 2008: A top military official announced that there is a high probability that Abu Sayyaf Group leader Sahiron was killed during a December 7 clash with Philippine troops. – PNA, December 19 [29]
• December 23, 2008: A grenade exploded amid a crowd attending a concert on Basilan Island in the southern Philippines. At least 16 people were injured. The Abu Sayyaf Group was suspected as being responsible for the blast. – AP, December 23 [30]
• December 24, 2008: Seven inmates, including two accused of membership with the Abu Sayyaf Group, escaped from a Philippine jail in Basilan Province in the southern Philippines. Three of the seven were immediately recaptured, but the others evaded authorities. – PNA, December 24[31]
January 2009
• January 14, 2009: Several inmates, including accused members of the ASG escaped from a provincial jail in the Philippines through a tunnel which they hid under books and prayer mats. By the time the escape was discovered, the inmates had fled into the jungle. [32]
• January 15, 2009: Three aid workers, Swiss Andreas Notter, Italian Eugenio Vagni and Filipino Jean Lacaba who are members of the International Committee of the Red Cross, were kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf Group in Patikul, Sulu. [33]
• January 19, 2009: Kidnapped ICRC aid workers called ICRC headquarters in the Philippines to request that military effort being made to locate them be ended. The Philippine military and police have deployed over 1,000 personnel to the Sulu province in an attempt to locate the hostages.[34]
• January 23, 2009: Islamic terrorists kidnapped three school teachers in the south and have taken them to Basilan island. The terrorists are demanding ransom of $127,000. [35]
• January 28,2009: The U.S. has issued a travel advisory for Mindanao, Philippines in a response to a surge of kidnappings by the ASG. [36]
• January 29,2009: In the first direct contact by Philippine officials, Provincial Vice Governor Lady Ann Sahidulla met with members of Abu Sayyaf and the 3 ICRC hostages taken captive earlier in January. Abu Sayyaf has broken its pattern of hostage-ransoming, but refusing to issue a monetary demand for the hostages. Instead, the group demanded investment in education and development projects for impoverished Muslim communities. [37]
February 2009
• February 1, 2009: Suspected Abu Sayyaf Group-linked militants kidnapped a nine-year-old boy on Basilan Island in the southern Philippines. – AFP, February 1 [38]
• February 13 2009: Omar Jalil, 36, a Sri Lankan activist from the nonpartisan group Nonviolent Peaceforce, which has been monitoring a decades-old Muslim separatist uprising in the Philippines, was taken by nine gunmen from his residence in coastal Lamitan town on Basilan island. [39]
• February 28, 2009: The Abu Sayyaf has made two demands for the release of three abducted International Committee of the Red Cross workers, said the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). These include the pullout of the military from Sulu and for the government to declare Jolo as an open port between Malaysia and Sulu to boast the economic development of the people of Western Mindanao.[40]
March 2009
• March 2, 2009: Jocelyn Gruta, the mother of the 9-year-old boy abducted in Lamitan City on Feb. 1, said she was asked to pay P5 million in ransom or her son would be killed.[41]
• March 8, 2009: Gunmen, suspected members of ASG, attacked a fishing boat in the volatile southern Philippines, shooting to death three fishermen and abducting two others. [42]
• March 17, 2009: An Abu Sayyaf Group sub-commander,Jul Asbi Jalmaani, and his aide were killed in an encounter with government troops in Sulu Tuesday. [43]
• March, 18 2009: ASG extremists threatened to behead one of their three Red Cross hostages if the Philippine military engages them in battle again. ASG leader Parad reiterated that he will not negotiate unless troops back off from his jungle stronghold.[44]
• March 28, 2009: Government officials on Saturday agreed to pull out troops, police forces, and civilian groups from a section of a cordoned-off area in Indanan, Sulu, to ensure the safety of three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) volunteers held hostage by the Abu Sayyaf[45].
April 2009
• April 01,2009: The National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) has been preparing for a mass evacuation in Sulu to prevent civilian casualties as government forces were prepared for a "full-scale rescue operation" against the Abu Sayyaf Group which has been holding three Red Cross workers hostage for 77 days at a village in Indanan town [46].
• April 02, 2009: Abu Sayyaf released one of three Red Cross hostages after almost three months in captivity.
• April 7, 2009: The Abu Sayyaf group has abducting at least 200 victims since 2003 in over 90 incidents, including the three International Committee of Red Cross workers in Sulu, according to a military document. The document showed that the Abu Sayyaf got over P22 million pesos (some $440,000) of ransom in its kidnappings in Sulu alone [47].
• April 7, 2009: Islamist militants that kidnapped three humanitarian workers in the Philippines have demanded a $5 million (SFr5.6 million) ransom, according to a military report. This ASG continues to hold two employees of the Geneva-based International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), including Andreas Notter, a Swiss citizen, on Jolo Island.
• April 9, 2009: The ICRC responded to ASG demands that $5 million or more than P200 million for the release of three kidnapped workers of ICRC. Sen. Richard Gordon said that the International Committee of the Red Cross would reject any demand for ransom for the release of its three volunteers kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf [48].
Interactions with governments: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo voiced strong support for the United States in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. She subsequently pushed to have ASG listed on the U.S. State Department FTO List. She cited Philippine national interests as the reason for her pro-U.S. stand and linked the struggle against international terrorism with the struggle against terrorism within the Philippines
[49]
Beginning in October 2001, the United States sent groups of military observers to Mindanao to assess operations against Abu Sayyaf by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), render advice, and examine AFP equipment needs.
[50]. President Bush extended $93 million in military aid to the Philippines when President Arroyo visited Washington in 2001, and he offered a direct U.S. military role in combating Abu Sayyaf. President Arroyo insisted that the U.S. military role should be advisory and that the AFP would retain full operational responsibility. By late December 2001, the AFP on Mindanao began to receive quantities of U.S. military equipment. Moreover, AFP commanders expressed frustration over the failure to rescue the hostages and suggested that they would support President Arroyo if she sought a more direct U.S. military role. It was announced in January 2002 that the United States would deploy 650 troops to Mindanao and Basilan within a month. Support/maintenance personnel would number 500. Special Forces numbering 150 would perform training and advisory functions; and some of these would accompany AFP units on Basilan.
In 2002 a significant decrease in membership and networking capacities due to joint counter-terrorism efforts by the Philippine and U.S. governments, reduced ASG capacity to engage in 'traditional' forms of terrorism.
Analysis: The modern ASG is a blend of terrorist organization and criminal organization. Many of their activities are not primarily terrorism but are used to gain funds to train, equip and plan future incidences of terrorism. In many respects, the changes witnessed in the ASG since its inception are best explained through the theoretical framework of organizational process theory.
While the Organizational approach accurately predicts and explains isomorphic changes witnessed in the ASG in the late 90’s and again in late 2007, it fails to adequately control for the way such changes manifested. Rather than experience a shift in ideology, the ASG maintained a militant Islamic orientation but significantly shifted the methods of achieving the goal of a Southeast Asian Islamic state
[51]. When the group experienced the lost of strong leadership, first in 1998 when founder Abdurajak Janjalani was killed and again in September 2006 and March 2007, when two ASG leaders, Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, were killed by joint counter-terrorism forces, there was a predicted spike in criminal-terrorist activities
[52]. In addition to the loss of the organizations primary leadership, the period of their death corresponded by increased counter-terrorism efforts but the AFP. The organization responded to pressure from outside by changing the incentives offered to members or through innovation. The dual external pressures and internal fragmentation of the ASG hierarchy caused subsequent leaders to increase rational-actor incentives, in the form of increased profits margins to retain ASG members. This criminalization of ASG methods appears counter-intuitive to Organization theories about inter-group competition.
Moreover, the unexpected criminalization of existing strategic objective, including the profit seeking through kidnapping and ransoming, is explained through the operational environment of the ASG. The Philippines are home to several Muslim separatist groups which provide intergroup competition with ASG, including the MILF, MNLF, and JI. While the Organizational approach would predict that the abundance of several ideologically similar groups would cause ideological isomorphism, the regional remnants of the al-Qaeda movement and principles prevented this
[53]. Former cooperation with al-Qaeda, which encouraged multiple efforts to advance the probability of an Islamic state, meant that for ASG maintaining ideological parity with other groups would insure continued, although often covert, support
[54]. By distinguishing themselves from rival organization through more extreme methods and high profits, the ASG secured a niche as the most fervent of the Muslim separatists groups.
Additional Information about the Abu Sayyaf Group:
Naval Postgraduate School - Group Profile
[2]
BBC News - Group Profile
[3]
Council on Foreign Relations - Group Profile
[4]
2002 Report on ASG for Congress about U.S.-Philippine Cooperation
[5]
Niksch, Larry. 2002.“Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation”. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress
[6]
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. “Background Notes: Philippines”. Department of State
[7]
References
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↑ Paddock, Richard. 2002. “Southeast Asian Terror Exhibits Al Qaeda Traits,” Los Angeles Times, March 3.
↑ Office of the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism. 2007.
Country Reports on Terrorism 2006: The Philippines. U.S. Department of State, April 30.
↑ Abuza,Zachary. 2007. “On the Defensive: Rebels Lose Ground in the Southern Philippines,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1.
↑ Gomez, Jim. 2007. “Militant May Lead Philippine Terrorists,” Associated Press, March 3.
↑ "Abu Sayyaf Hit by Leadership, Funding Woes,”. 2008. Associated Press, April 4.
↑ Rosario, Alfredo G. 2009.[
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2009/feb/26/yehey/opinion/20090226opi2.html Why the military can’t crush the Abu Sayyaf]. The Manilla Times. Feb 26.
↑ Who are the Abu Sayyaf?. 2000. BBC World News. Dec 30.
↑ Shasha,Deng. 2009. "Philippine military says hardcore Abu Sayyaf reduced to fewer than 100".
ChinaView World News February 11.
↑ The Return of Abu Sayyaf?
↑ “Abu Sayyaf Group (Philippines, Islamist Separatists)” 2008. Council on Foreign Relations. June 25.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9235/ (Accessed Feb 03, 2009).
↑ Vaughn, Bruce. 2005. “Islam in South and Southeast Asia “. Congressional Research Services Report for Congress. Feb 8.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/43999.pdf (Accessed Feb 03, 2009).
↑ abs-cbnNEWS.com2009. "Abu Sayyaf leader claims Red Cross kidnappings not for ransom". Feb 06.
↑ BBC World News. 2009. "Philippines hostage 'wants talks'". Feb 18.
↑ MILF: Abu Sayyaf makes 2 demands for ICRC workers. 2009. GMA News Feb 28.
↑ United States Pacific Command. 2009.
“Abu Sayyaf: Questions and Answers”. Combating Terrorism in the Philippines. (Accessed March 12, 2009).
↑ Combating Terrorism Center.
Source: CTC Sentinel, Issue 11. 2008. Erich Marquardt, ed. West Point. October.
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Combating Terrorism Center.
Source: CTC Sentinel, Issue 12. 2008. Erich Marquardt, ed. West Point. November.
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Combating Terrorism Center.
Source: CTC Sentinel, Issue 1. 2009. Erich Marquardt, ed. West Point. January.
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ International Herald Tribune
↑ New York Times
↑ International Herald Tribune
↑ Combating Terrorism Center.
Source: CTC Sentinel, Issue 2. 2009. Erich Marquardt, ed. West Point. February.
↑ [1]
↑ The Associated Press
↑ Combating Terrorism Center.
Source: CTC Sentinel, Issue 3. 2009. Erich Marquardt, ed. West Point. March.
↑ The Associated Press
↑ MILF: Abu Sayyaf makes 2 demands for ICRC workers. 2009. GMA News Feb 28.
↑ Alipala, Julie. 2009.
Kidnappers want P5M, says boy’s ma. Philippine Daily Inquirer. March 2.
↑ International Herald Times
↑ Vicente, Leila. 2009.
Abu Sayyaf sub-leader, aide killed in Sulu clashes. ABS-CBN News. March 17.
↑ Gomez, Jim.
Extremists threaten to behead Red Cross hostage. Associated Press. March 18.
↑ Lacson, Nonoy E. 2009. “Troops pulled back for hostages: Gov’t officials agree to demand of Abu Sayyaf”. Manila Bulletin Publishing Company. March 28
http://mb.com.ph/articles/200657/troops-pulled-back-hostages (accessed April 09, 2009).
↑ Dacanay, Barbara Mae. 2009. “Mass evacuation begins in Sulu”. Gulfnews. April 01.
http://www.gulfnews.com/world/Philippines/10300416.html . (accessed April 9, 2009).
↑ “Military: Abu Sayyaf abducted over 200 since 2003”. 2009. The Philippine Star. April 07.
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=456066&publicationSubCategoryId=200 (accessedApril9, 2009).
↑ Calica, Aurea . 2009.
"Red Cross rejects $5-million Sayyaf ransom demand” . The Philippine Star. April 9. (accessed April 09, 2009)
↑ Landler, Mark. 2001.
"Philippines Offers U.S. Its Troops and Bases". New York Times, October 2:5
↑ Landler, Mark. 2001.
"U.S. Advisers May Aid Philippine Antiterror Effort". New York Times, October 11.
↑ Brookes, Peter. 2007. “The Forgotten Front”. The Heritage Foundation. July 11.
http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed071107c.cfm (Accessed Jan 24, 2009).
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http://www.cfr.org/publication/9365/terrorism_havens.html (Accessed Feb 03, 2009)
↑ Office of the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism. 2007. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2006: The Philippines”. U.S. Department of State, April 30.
↑ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. 2007. “Terrorist Organizational Models”. In A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty First Century, DCSINT Handbook No.1. Aug 15
↑ Abuza, Zachary. 2005. “Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf,” Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, September 1
↑ Paddock, Richard. 2002. “Southeast Asian Terror Exhibits Al Qaeda Traits,” Los Angeles Times, March 3.
↑ Office of the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism. 2007.
Country Reports on Terrorism 2006: The Philippines. U.S. Department of State, April 30.
↑ Abuza,Zachary. 2007. “On the Defensive: Rebels Lose Ground in the Southern Philippines,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1.
↑ Gomez, Jim. 2007. “Militant May Lead Philippine Terrorists,” Associated Press, March 3.
↑ "Abu Sayyaf Hit by Leadership, Funding Woes,”. 2008. Associated Press, April 4.
↑ Rosario, Alfredo G. 2009.[
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2009/feb/26/yehey/opinion/20090226opi2.html Why the military can’t crush the Abu Sayyaf]. The Manilla Times. Feb 26.
↑ Who are the Abu Sayyaf?. 2000. BBC World News. Dec 30.
↑ Shasha,Deng. 2009. "Philippine military says hardcore Abu Sayyaf reduced to fewer than 100".
ChinaView World News February 11.
↑ The Return of Abu Sayyaf?
↑ “Abu Sayyaf Group (Philippines, Islamist Separatists)” 2008. Council on Foreign Relations. June 25.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9235/ (Accessed Feb 03, 2009).
↑ Vaughn, Bruce. 2005. “Islam in South and Southeast Asia “. Congressional Research Services Report for Congress. Feb 8.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/43999.pdf (Accessed Feb 03, 2009).
↑ abs-cbnNEWS.com2009. "Abu Sayyaf leader claims Red Cross kidnappings not for ransom". Feb 06.
↑ BBC World News. 2009. "Philippines hostage 'wants talks'". Feb 18.
↑ MILF: Abu Sayyaf makes 2 demands for ICRC workers. 2009. GMA News Feb 28.
↑ United States Pacific Command. 2009.
“Abu Sayyaf: Questions and Answers”. Combating Terrorism in the Philippines. (Accessed March 12, 2009).
↑ Combating Terrorism Center.
Source: CTC Sentinel, Issue 11. 2008. Erich Marquardt, ed. West Point. October.
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Combating Terrorism Center.
Source: CTC Sentinel, Issue 12. 2008. Erich Marquardt, ed. West Point. November.
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Combating Terrorism Center.
Source: CTC Sentinel, Issue 1. 2009. Erich Marquardt, ed. West Point. January.
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ Ibid
↑ International Herald Tribune
↑ New York Times
↑ International Herald Tribune
↑ Combating Terrorism Center.
Source: CTC Sentinel, Issue 2. 2009. Erich Marquardt, ed. West Point. February.
↑ [1]
↑ The Associated Press
↑ Combating Terrorism Center.
Source: CTC Sentinel, Issue 3. 2009. Erich Marquardt, ed. West Point. March.
↑ The Associated Press
↑ MILF: Abu Sayyaf makes 2 demands for ICRC workers. 2009. GMA News Feb 28.
↑ Alipala, Julie. 2009.
Kidnappers want P5M, says boy’s ma. Philippine Daily Inquirer. March 2.
↑ International Herald Times
↑ Vicente, Leila. 2009.
Abu Sayyaf sub-leader, aide killed in Sulu clashes. ABS-CBN News. March 17.
↑ Gomez, Jim.
Extremists threaten to behead Red Cross hostage. Associated Press. March 18.
↑ Lacson, Nonoy E. 2009. “Troops pulled back for hostages: Gov’t officials agree to demand of Abu Sayyaf”. Manila Bulletin Publishing Company. March 28
http://mb.com.ph/articles/200657/troops-pulled-back-hostages (accessed April 09, 2009).
↑ Dacanay, Barbara Mae. 2009. “Mass evacuation begins in Sulu”. Gulfnews. April 01.
http://www.gulfnews.com/world/Philippines/10300416.html . (accessed April 9, 2009).
↑ “Military: Abu Sayyaf abducted over 200 since 2003”. 2009. The Philippine Star. April 07.
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=456066&publicationSubCategoryId=200 (accessedApril9, 2009).
↑ Calica, Aurea . 2009.
"Red Cross rejects $5-million Sayyaf ransom demand” . The Philippine Star. April 9. (accessed April 09, 2009)
↑ Landler, Mark. 2001.
"Philippines Offers U.S. Its Troops and Bases". New York Times, October 2:5
↑ Landler, Mark. 2001.
"U.S. Advisers May Aid Philippine Antiterror Effort". New York Times, October 11.
↑ Brookes, Peter. 2007. “The Forgotten Front”. The Heritage Foundation. July 11.
http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed071107c.cfm (Accessed Jan 24, 2009).
↑ Bhattacharji, Preeti. 2008. “Terrorism Havens: Philippines”. Council on Foreign Relations. June 30.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9365/terrorism_havens.html (Accessed Feb 03, 2009)
↑ Office of the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism. 2007. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2006: The Philippines”. U.S. Department of State, April 30.
↑ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. 2007. “Terrorist Organizational Models”. In A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty First Century, DCSINT Handbook No.1. Aug 15
